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Donald Griffin Strove to give
Animals their Due
Those of us who are fortunate to study animal behaviour cannot but marvel at the
seemingly conscious and intelligent behaviours that animals sometimes display.  Birds
are known to adapt the behaviour they use to obtain insects from under the barks of
trees, to steal cream from milk bottles covered with metal foil. Robert Hinde and
others in England showed that such behaviour was ‘invented’ by a few individuals and
then copied by many others.  Jane Goodall has described how chimpanzees will select
a small branch, remove leaves and twigs and thus fashion it into a suitable tool, carry
it to a termite’s nest and then use it to retrieve termites by probing with it.  Alex
Kacelnik at Oxford and others have shown how crows can bend pieces of metal wire
and fashion hooks with which they retrieve worms from bottles.  Closer home, Milind
Watve and his students have shown that bee eaters will not approach their nests if they
spot intruders to whom they are visible, but will do so if they spot intruders to whom
they are not visible, suggesting that bee eaters have what psychologists call a ‘theory of
mind’.  In our own research, we have found numerous instances of members of social
wasp colonies behaving in seemingly intelligent ways.  For example, groups of workers
will revolt against the queen and leave together to start their own colony, a given set of
workers will cooperate with some queens and not others, workers will sometimes show
preferential behaviour towards one but not another dominant individual.
Ethologists, behavioural ecologists and sociobiologists, as we variously call ourselves,
have (at least until recently) steadfastly refused to attribute any form of consciousness,
awareness or intelligence to animals performing these and many other impressive
feats.  Instead, it is routine to consider animals as being programmed like robots, to
produce expected responses to the stimuli they encounter.  It is true that to understand
the evolutionary consequences of the behaviour patterns,  for example, it is not
necessary to attribute consciousness to the animals performing these behaviours.
Some of us have begun to feel that in our eagerness to prevent the problem of animal
intelligence and consciousness from becoming a stumbling block in the acceptance of
our sociobiological theories, we have gone overboard and entirely ignored the possi-
bility that animals may sometime be conscious of their actions.
Without doubt, Donald Griffin (1915-2003) was almost single-handedly responsible
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for this change of heart in at least some of us.  Griffin made his name by discovering
echolocation in bats and writing a widely accessible book Listening in the dark.   In the
early 1970’s, Griffin decided to devote himself to the cause of animals’ consciousness.
From then until his death in November 2003, at the age of 88, Griffin used every
possible means available to him to promote the study of animal minds.  He wrote and
lectured extensively, reinterpreted many old observations, challenged people studying
diverse groups of animals to devise ways of obtaining a glimpse into the minds of
animals and wrote three books.  The burden of Griffin’s message was that, viewing
animals as being in a state comparable to human sleepwalkers, will never let us find out
if animals have conscious experiences.  It is of course possible to define consciousness
as a subjective experience and claim that the only way we know that other human
beings have consciousness is because they  communicate their experiences to us
through language. With such a definition, animal consciousness is unknowable.
Clearly, such a definition is not very useful.  The aim is not to show that animals are
the same as humans.  Instead, the aim is to explore the limits of animal behaviour as it
borders on intelligence, awareness and consciousness.  Griffin defined consciousness
in animals as the ‘versatile adaptability of behaviour to changing circumstances and
challenges’.  Griffin suggested that we should make a three-pronged attack on the
problem.  First, we should focus on the abilities of animals to behave in versatile ways
in response to novel situations.  Second, we should explore the neurophysiological
correlates of consciousness in humans and search for similar neurophysiological
phenomena in animals.  Third, we should focus especially on communicative behaviour
in animals because he argued that communication provides an especially useful
window to the minds of animals.  He cautioned that we can only use this window
effectively if we stop thinking of animal communication signals as “groans of pain”
and start thinking of them as an attempt on the part of animals to assess other animals’
moods and thoughts and thereby predict their probable behavioural responses.
Perhaps the most impressive example of animal communication is the dance language
of honey bees.  A forager bee will return home and perform a dance which contains
information about the quality/quantity of food it has discovered as well as about the
distance and direction to the food source.  Bees closely following the dancer on the
nest comb will then be able to locate the food source on their own, without being led to
the spot by the dancing bee.  Recent research has uncovered an impressive degree of
flexibility and variability of the honey bee dance language, making it a prime candi-
date to explore the possibility of awareness and consciousness in invertebrates.
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By and large Griffin’s writings on this subject have met with harsh criticism primarily
because his critics continue to define consciousness in a way that excludes the
possibility that we can find out if it exists in animals and then claim that Griffin has
not produced any definitive evidence, the ‘smoking gun’, for his belief in animal
consciousness.  Undaunted, Griffin carried on till the very end and herein lies an
important lesson both for us as individuals and for us as a scientific community.  If
some of us are inspired to persist in studying what we believe is important in the face
of widespread scepticism, Donald Griffin’s efforts would not have gone in vain.  The
lesson for the scientific community is more complex and perhaps controversial.  The
lesson I would draw is that the scientific community should find ways of identifying
the best minds and give them the licence to pursue their ideas unfettered by excessive
peer pressure, up until the time their ideas begin to fail.  This is the only way we will
know the limits of any idea.  The scientific community has much to gain from
competent radicals such as Donald Griffin.
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